Abstract-Certificateless short signature can not only have the advantage of certificateless signature, but also provide a short signature size in communication. However , all existing certificateless short signature scheme only proven secure against a normal adversary which can only obtain the valid signatures for the original public key rather than a super adversary which can obtain the valid signatures for the replaced public key. In order to solve the problem, so in this paper, we proposed an efficient and provably secure certificateless short signature scheme which can be proved that it is secure against super adversaries in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Furthermore, our scheme can provide both the strongest security level and the shortest signature size compared the existed provably secure certificateless short signature scheme.
INTRODUCTION
Short signatures have a great advantage in applications where the bandwidth of a communication channel is limited. Since Boneh et al. [1] proposed the first short signature in traditional PKC which called BLS signature where the signature size are about half the size of DSA signatures while with the similar level of security, many concrete short signature schemes have been proposed in different public key cryptosystems [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Due to certificateless signature can not only avoid the inherent key escrow problem in identitybased public key cryptosystems, and do not need expensive certificates management in the public key infrastructure, it's a highlight to extend the notion of short signatures into certificateless cryptography and design certificateless signatures with short signature size. However, to construct an efficient and secure certificateless short signature is not an easy work for the adversaries who can be allowed to obtain valid signatures under the replaced public key [2] .
The first certificateless short signature was proposed by Huang et al. [2] . In their scheme, Huang et al. revised the security models of certificateless signature scheme, they classified type I/II adversaries into normal, strong and super type I/II adversaries according to their attack power. A normal adversary can only obtain the valid signatures for the original public key, a strong adversary can obtain the valid signatures for the replaced public key if additionally submits the correspond secret key, a super adversary can obtain the valid signatures for the current public key. In 2009 Du et al. [3] proposed a short CLS scheme, they claimed that their short certificateless signature scheme is provably secure against the strong type I normal type II adversaries in the random oracle model. Choi et al. [4] demonstrated the short CLS scheme is insecure against the strong type I adversary. They also proposed a short CLS scheme and proved their scheme is provably secure against the super type I/II adversary in the random oracle model under the CDH assumption. Recently, Tian et al. [5] show the scheme is insecure against a strong type I adversary. To enhance the security of short signatures, in 2012 Raylin Tso et al. [6] presented a strongly secure certificateless short signatures based on bilinear pairing, their scheme is strongly secure in the random oracle model. But all the existing certificateless short signature scheme only proven secure against a normal adversary which can only obtain the valid signatures for the original public key rather than a super adversary which can obtain the valid signatures for the replaced public key.
A. Contributions and organization
Our contributions: In this paper, we present an efficient certificateless short signature scheme that is proved to be secure in the random oracle model under the hardness assumption of CDH. The signature size of our scheme is as short as BLS short signature [1] . Compared with all other certificateless short signature [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] , our scheme is the only one with provable security against super adversaries. Moreover signing a message requires only one exponentiation and one multiplication in a multiplicative cyclic group 1 G , and signature verification requires only one pairing (on-line) operation.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. section II, we describe some fundamental backgrounds and define the certificateless signature scheme and its security model. section III and section IV, we propose a new efficient and provable secure short CLS scheme which is secure against the super type I/II adversary. section V, we compare our scheme with existing certificateless short signatures scheme, and we conclude the paper in section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Bilinear Map A bilinear map satisfying the three properties of bilinear, non-degenerate, computable is said to be an admissible bilinear map [7] . We can make this map using the Weil pairing [8] .
B. Complexity assumption
The proof of our scheme is under computational DiffieHellman (CDH) assumption in the random oracle model [7] .
C. Certificateless signature scheme
A certificateless short signature scheme is specified by six polynomial time algorithms which is very similarly to the algorithms defined in Al-Riyami and Paterson [7] . The only difference in our scheme is that the user's public key ID pk needed in the Set-Partial-Private-Key algorithm in order to against the super adversary.
D. Security models
For certificateless cryptosystems, there are two types of adversaries which called type I/II adversary with different capabilities according to the widely accepted notion of security defined by Al-Riyami and Paterson [7] .
Generally, five oracles can be accessed by adversaries according to game, specifications will be given shortly.
Create-User：Input identity . If ID has been created, the oracle returns a valid signature σ signed by the current private key of the user with identity ID . Otherwise, a symbol ⊥ is returned. Note that ID pk is the current public key of the user with identity ID .
In our scheme we will let 1 A be a type I adversary and 2
A be a type II adversary. Two games (Game 1 and Game 2) will be consider in here where 1 A and 2 A will respectively interact with its challenger C in these two games. If the success probability of both 1 A and 2 A is negligible, then we say that a CLS scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attackers.
Game 1: This game is executed between 1 A and a challenger C .
Setup: Taken a security parameter k as input, C runs the Setup algorithm to obtain a master key s and the system parameters params . C sends params to 1 A , keeps s secret. Queries: 1 A makes a polynomial bounded number of all queries defined above in an adaptive manner. Adv is negligible, we will say a certificateless signature scheme is secure against type II adversary. Definition 3. If the certificateless signature scheme is secure against both type I and type II attacks defined above, we said the scheme is existentially unforgettably against adaptive chosen message and chosen identity attack.
As we see, adversaries defined above are very similar to the super adversaries defined in Huang et al. [8] , namely adversaries are allowed to obtain valid signature under any public keys chosen by itself in the public key space.
III.
OUR CERTIFICATELESS SHORT SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we describe a new construction of certificateless short signature scheme. It consists of the following algorithms:
G G be bilinear groups of a prime order p, where k is the security parameter of the scheme, Let 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, a formal security analysis of our proposed scheme in the random oracle model will be given by us. In our model, the adversary has the power to obtain the valid signature under the replaced public key, which is similar to the super adversary defined in Huang et al. [2] .
Theorem1 (Unforgettability against type I adversary): If there exists a type I adaptively chosen message and identity adversary 1 A who can make at most cu q Create-User queries, pke q Partial-Private-Key queries, sve q Secret-value queries and s q Sign queries, and can break the unforgettability of the proposed scheme via type I attack in polynomial time t with success probability ε . Then we show that there exists an algorithm ζ that can solve CDH problem with probability 1 A who can break the unforgettability of the proposed scheme via type I attack, then we can construct a algorism ς , such at ς can use 1 A as a black-box and solve the CDH problem.
Let ( , , ) a b g g g be a random instance of CDH problem taken as input by ζ . ζ first sets the system's master public key as pub a P g = and generates params according to the Setup algorithm, then initializes 1 A with pub P and parames . Then ζ simulates the oracles and answers 1 A 's queries as follows. To complete the proof, we need to calculate the probability that ζ succeeds and the time ζ runs. If ζ does not halt in the simulation and 1 ID u * = , then 1 A can forge a valid signature with advantage ε . The probability that ζ does not halt in the simulation is ( . Therefore, the success probability ' ε that ζ solves CDH problem is . Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof procedure of unforgettability against type I adversary, it's given in http://blog.sina.com.cn/u/2120716550 in detailed.
V. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we compare our certificateless short signature scheme with other existing certificateless short signature schemes from the aspects of communication and computation cost in sign and verification phase and type of against adversary respectively. In the comparison, the operations of 
